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Criminal Law

Tricl<s
Prosecutors Play
Bennett L. Gershman
Liminal ddense lawyers must
recognize and challenge prosecutorial misconduct whenever it occurs . In my opinion , prosecuto~'s today wiel~i greater
power, engage In more egregious mIsconduct, and are less subject to judicial
or bar association oversight than ever
befi)re. Few defense lawyers or commentators would disagree with these conclusions. Indeed, some types of prosecutorial misconduct have become almost " normative to the system." I
This is not to say, of course, that private attorneys do not engage in similar
misconduct . They do. There are, however, important differences between prosecutors and defense attorneys that make
prosecutorial violations much more
insidious.
Prosecutors are generally perceived by
juric ' as prcstigioLls a.nd honomblc " cha111f io ns < f justi(c." The r have powerfu l
strat 'gic and tin ancia l resources tha t
u 'unll , gi ve them disLinct advanrage.
over rhciT adversaries. And PI'( , eCll ror.
operate under higher ethical standards
than other lawyers-i .e., a special obligation "to seck justice." 2 Despite or because of these differences, prosecutorial
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misconduct is all too often overlooked,
condoned, or found to be harmless. 3
Prosecutors function in a variety of
contexts in the criminal justice system .
They enjoy vast decision-maki ng powers
in areas sLlch as charging crimes, plea
bargaining, granting immunity, summoning witnesses to grand juries, and
determining sentences. Prosecutorial
domination over the "awful instruments
of the/criminal law," to use Justice Felix
Frankfurter's apt terminology, 4 is largely
uncontrolled by the courts. 5 Indeed,
unfettered prosecutorial discretion may
be the most terrifying and the most insoluble problem in the administration
of criminal justice.
That problem , however is bey md the
sco pe o f this article. Th e ~(]ClI S here is
on prosccmmial mise ndllC[ :J.t oi. l ha
results in depriving the defendant f ,
fair nnd rcliable determination f guil t .
While the incidence of misconduct is
increasing, judges ' willingness to impose
remedies such as reversal of convictions
or dismissal of charges is decreasing. This
is not an anomaly. There is a direct correlation between this laissez faire judicial
attitude and the escalation of prosecutorial misconduct .
Just as the threat of penal sanctions
is thought to deter illegal behavior by
criminals, the prospect of judicial sanctions such as reversals, dismissals, or
contempt citations would be expected
to deter errant behavior by rational
prosecutors. However, since " winning
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the war 011 crime" is a major political
prcoc upatiol1 IOday, [he procedural safeguards :lJld prohibitions set up to ensllre
that detCndanrs get fa ir trials may be
seen by some as retarding progress toward
that goal.
It is therefore not surprising that to
affirm convictions despite prosecutorial
misconduct, appellate courts increasingly invoke a variety of questionable procedures. These include broadening use
of harmless-error review, overlooking
misconduct that was allegedly "invited"
by defense counsel, ignoring misconduct to which defense counsel failed to
object, or indulging in the fiction that
so-called "curative instructions" by the
IT;''\. judj"Tt: a. ·tuall), mitigate rhc harm .
By lh . same taken ace' s t (()lla tcl~l l
r 'vic\ through th writ of habeas corpus i graduall y bcing er ded throug h
doctrinal and procedlll'al bars. x:lmpk '
of c h c..~c barriel's include exhaustion,
default, waiver, and the need to show
prejudice.
This ;s not to say that trial or appellate
courts are completely insensitive to prosecutorial excesses. Some trial judges monitor pro e ClI rDl'S quite dosd l-pa rticulaJ'~

I), rh o 'c wi th track rccO!" is o flx:having
overzealo ll. ly. , 0111' appellate Ol1 rts
,tLo keep \ atch 0 11 prosecutors. And
ol11e ba r ssoLi. ti n o-ffi 'ials bring d is~
ciplinary charges against proseclltors [{)t'
egregious trial behavior.
Having said this, I will now turn to
a discussion of some of the more egrc-

lohn K.lChik

gious "trial tricks" that proseclltors sometimes play.

Assassinating Defendant's Character
Attacking a dcfcndant's character makes
a conviction more likely. The devastatIng impact on a jury of a defendant's
prior criminal or sordid acts is clear and
has been empirically proven. 6 Consider
~he William Kennedy Smith rape trial
In Florida. Had the prosecution been
able to place bcfcJre the jury evidence
that Smith had engaged in three prior

episodes of sexual misconduct, the verdict might have been different.
Prosecutors have portrayed defendants
as dangerous, sinister, and undesirable
characters who are therefore more likely
to have committed the crime charged,
and convictions occasionally are reversed
because of such misconduct. 7 Attempting to insinuate that a defendant was
guilty by showing that he had associated
with, was related to, or was in the company of criminals is improper. 8 So is stigmatizing defendants either directly
TlUAL AP1UL 1992

(through cross-examination)9 or indirectly (through extrinsic proot)10 by intimating that the dcfcndant has a criminal record and therefore is more likely
to have committed the crime charged.

Introducing Improper Evidence
Presenting false, misleading, or inadmissible evidence is unethical and potentially violates due process. II Examples
of this practice include using perjured
testimony l2 and introducing physical or
other evidence that deceives the jury

47

about a material 6et. 13 It is also unethical for prosecutors to seck to make a £.1lse
impression on the jUt)' by loading questions with innuendos when no supporting evidence exists . 14 Suggesting without any factual basis that defendant's
wife left him because of his drug transactions is an example of such a bad-faith
question. 15
Similarly, referring to polygraph tests,16
withdrawn guilty pleas, 17 or guilty pleas
of co-conspirators l8 may be an improper
tactic deliberately designed to distort the
f.1ct-finding process against the defendant. Forcing a defendant or defense witness under cross-examination to characterize the testimony of a prosecution
witness as "lies" is a frequently used
tactic that invites appellate censure. 19
Inflaming Juror Prejudice
Prosecutors know that appeals to the
jul)"s passions and prejudices, although
improper, may skew the jury's evaluation of the prooPo toward conviction.
To that end, prosecutors have displayed
infiammatOl), and inadmissible physical
evidence before juries;21 offcred gruesome and irrelevant photographs of the
victim;22 elicited inflammatory testimony;23 and injected gratuitous, inflammatory rhetoric into the proceedings. 24
Summation gives the prosecutor a
unique opportunity to prejudice the defendant. Common examples ofin£1a111matory argument include exhorting juries
to win the war on crime;25 inciting them
to vengeance;26 using insulting and abusive epithets and invective to describe
the defendam;2? appealing to racial, ethnic, national, or religious prejudice;28
appealing to wealth and class bias/ 9 and
imputing to the defendant violence and
threats against witnesses. 30
Violating the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination
It is improper for a prosecutor to encourage the JUI)' to infer guilt from the
defendant's silence at triaP! or failure to
explain his conduct to the police after
arrest. 32 This tactic has been used to impeach a defendant's testimony at triaP3
and to argue that if the defendant was
innocent, he would have testified, but
because he has not, he is guilty.
Appellate reversal is more likely when
the prosecutor's comments refer directly
to the defendant's failure to testify. 34
Prosecutors therefore tL)' to make the
point more subtly, through oblique references to the government's proof being
"uncontradicted,"35 "unrefuted,"36 or
48
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"undenied."3? Although the prosecutor's intent here is clear, such references
often escape appellate sanction.
Comments about the defcndant's f.'lilure to call witnesses should also be clOSely
scrutinized to determine whether they
involve a prohibited comment on the
privilege against self-incrimination. 38
Denigrating Defense Counsel
Attacks on defense counsel are not
unusual. By belittling defense counsel ,
prosecutors may believe that they call
gain an advantage before the jUlY Some
prosecutors disparage the defense by suggesting that defense counsel's objections
were made in bad f.1ith . 39 Another tactic
is to insinuate that defense counsel docs
not believe the client's testimony or has
no confidence in the case. 40
Personal attacks on defense counsel 's
ethics and integrity are not uncommon.
Prosecutors have insinuated that defense
counsel presented "contrived testimony,"41 "f:1bricated a defense,"42 or
engaged in illegal conduct. 43
Some jurisdictions allow prosecutors
to make an opening summation and
thell a rebuttal summation. Some COUITS
have recognized a phenomenon known
as "sandbagging," where the prosecutor
makes new arguments and raises new
theories for t11e first time during rebuttal
summation. 44 Coutts look with disfavor
on this practice when it unfairly takes
defense counsel by surprise.
Exploiting Prosecutorial Prestige
It is unethical for prosecutors to manipulate the jury's evaluation of the evidence by stressing their own personal
integrity and the prestige of their office. 45
Prosecutors disregard this rule when they
try to enhance a witness's credibility by
expressing their own faith in the witness 's truthfulness 46 or the defendant's
guiltY This personal vouching makes
the prosecutor an unsworn witness.
Insinuating that information outside
the record verifies the witness's truthfldness is another form of improper vouching. 48 So is suggesting that cooperation
agreements with witnesses show that the
prosecutor knows what the truth is and
that by entering into such an agreement
with the witness, the prosecutor is ensuring that the truth will be revealed . 49

f

Misrepresenting the Record
It is improper for prosecutors to reter
to matters outside the record;50 to point
to exhibits or testimony that have not
been entered into evidence, implying

II
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a
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t1lC)' are incriminating;51 to misrepresent
[he record;52 or to insinuate that issues
ortact have already been decided .53 Prosccutors have also been rebuked filr going
outside the record and commenting on
the consequCllces that might result from
the jury's verdict. 54 These comments are
intended to lessen the jurors' sense of
Icsponsibility and recognition ofthe seriousness of their verdict. Impermissible
rGJ11arks include references to the possibility of mitigation of punishment by
the judge,55 the availability of pardon or
executive clemency, 56 and the availability of appellate review.57

finding Remedies
Sanctions for prosecutorial misconduct
infrequent . Appellate reversal is seen
as too costly to society. 58 Judge Learned
Hand 's argument is endorsed by most
courts. Referring to a proseclltor's misconduct, Judge Hand wrote, "That was
plainly an improper remark, and if reversal would do more than show our
disapproval, we might reverse. Unhappily,
it would accomplish little towards punishing the offender, and would upset the
conviction of a plainly guilt), man ....
It seems to us that reversal would be an
immoderate penalty."59
Civil damage actions against prosecutors are usually unsuccessful because of
the doctrine of proseclltorial immunity.60 Contempt sanctions are rarely employed,61 and professional discipline is
cven more rarely utilized. 62
In such a climate of opinion, effectively chaUenging prosecutorial misconduct
at the trial level becomes more import:\I1t aU the time. It requires, first, a thorough understanding of the substantive
rules governing the parameters of prosecutorial behavior; second, an alertness
tu conduct that violates those rules; and
third, the ability to make a record through
til11ely objection or by other means.
Valid claims are frequently lost through
the failure of trial counsel to register a
timely protest.
Knowing from the outset that proseClltorial misconduct ma)' occur allows
defense counsel to make an advance motion such as a motion in limine to prevent such misconduct before it occurs.
These motions have been made when
defense counsc! knows that a particular
prosecutor has a track record of engagIllg in specific types of misbehaviorfor example, asking questions without
~ny evidentiary foundation , eliciting
llladmissible and inflammatoty evidence
SUch as prior bad acts by the defendant,
~lre
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nr using part icu larly inJhmm , tory language in argllmen t ro [he jllry.
Mrlny defe nsc I n\vycl~~ un: r +lIct:mr to
ant;lgo l l~,(; pn SCClIt )I'S with whom rhey
have to de:1.1 O il a rcgular basis, However,
making a f(mnal complaint with a state
or local bar association or with th c U.S,
I Cp;lrll11Cnr of JlIsti«~'s Office of Probsio nal Respo nsibi lity may be not only
all appru priate rind cni:ctivc J'CCOllI-:,;e,
hut rhe besr w hen prosc utoria l 1111Scondu ct ocellI
0
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